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Establishing Locus Standi Under Article

173(2) of the EEC Treaty
INTRODUCTION

Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome1 allows natural and legal persons2

to obtain judicial review of certain legal acts of the Council or Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC Council or Commission). Specifically, Article 173(2) allows nonaddressees of a decision 3 or
a decision in the form of a regulation 4 to petition the Court of Justice of
1 Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 75, 2 COMMON M T. REP. (CCH) 4635 [hereinafter cited
as the EEC Treaty]. Article 173 provides:
(1) The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission
other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions
brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence,
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule
of law relating to its application or misuse of powers.
(2) Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against
a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a
regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the
former.
(3) The proceedings provided for in this article shall be instituted within two months of the
publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the
day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.
Id.
2 Legal persons include, for example, trade associations, enterprises and cooperatives. See generally Angulo & Dawson, Access by Natural and Legal Persons to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 583, notes 98-111 and accompanying text (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Angulo]; 4 H. SMIT AND P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY § 173.14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SMIT &
HERZOG].
3 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty lists the types of legal acts which can be adopted by the EEC
Council or Commission. Decisions are always addressed to either a Member State or a natural or
legal person. They are directly binding on the addressee. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at 78-79, 2
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4901. Examples of decisions include the Commission deciding that a
Member State can take protective measures to protect its internal markets or granting a private
individual an exemption from the Community's antitrust laws. EEC Treaty, Article 173(2) allows
addressees and nonaddressecs to challenge decisions. See EEC Treaty, Art. 173, supra note I. This
Comment will only discuss nonaddressee challenges of decisions.
4 The highest possible legal act of the Community is the regulation. Regulations are binding in
their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. EEC Treaty, supranote 1, art. 189, at 79,
2 COMMON MKr. Ru,. (CCH) 1 4901. Regulations do not have specific addressees; they are general
legislative measures. The antitrust provision, Regulation 17, is an example. Occasionally, a regulalion is not a legislative measure but an administrative measure, affecting an ascertainable group of
persons. The Court will look beyond the form of such a measure and declare it to be a decision. For
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the European Community 5 (the European Court) for an annulment of
the legal act on one of four grounds.6 Before an application for an annul-

ment is admissible, however, the applicant must show that the legal act is
of "direct and individual concern" to him.7 Yet, the European Court has
not clearly interpreted "direct and individual concern": the locus standi
requirement, 8 or the right of appearance in the European Court. The
European Court's unclear interpretation of the locus standi requirement
generates uncertainty and reduces the utility of Article 173(2) as a judicial review provision. 9
a discussion of when a regulation is really a decision, see T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 354 (1981).

5 The European Court is composed of twelve judges, conventionally one judge from each Member State plus an additional judge to prevent deadlocks. Each judge serves a term of six years. The
terms are staggered. The Court sits in a quorum whenever the Council or Commission brings an
action or requests the Court to sit in full to hear a case. Otherwise, the judges form chambers of
three to hear less important cases. EEC Treaty, supra note 1,arts. 165, 167, at 73-4, 2 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 4600; T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 4, at 26-38.
Most generally, the Court's jurisdiction is divided into direct jurisdiction and indirect or preliminary jurisdiction. Id. at 33. In the former, the plaintiff or applicant brings an action directly before
the Court. The Court serves as the court of first and last resort. An example of a direct action is a
judicial review action, such as an annulment proceeding. There, the applicant seeks to have the
Court declare an act of the Council or Commission void. See infra note 6.
In its preliminary jurisdiction, the European Court is not the court of first and last resort. The
applicant has initiated his action in the national courts and it will ultimately be decided there. T.C.
HARTLEY, supra note 4, at 34. The Court only answers abstract questions of law directed to it by
the national court. The national court then applies the answer to its question in the case before it.
Id.; see generally L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1977).
6 In an annulment proceeding, the applicant seeks to have the Court invalidate a legal act of the
Council or Commission on one of four specified grounds: (1) lack of competence; (2) infringement of
an essential procedural requirement; (3) infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its
application; or (4) misuse of powers. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173(1). If the applicant proves
one of these grounds, then the Court must declare the act null and void. EEC Treaty, supra note 1,
art. 174, at 76, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4641; SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 2, § 174.03.
When annulling the act, the Court recognizes an existing nullity rather than the annulling of a
theretofore valid act. SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 2, § 174.05. The act is void from the time it came
into existence. Id. The declaration of nullity has a binding effect on the whole world. Id. However,
the Member States must follow such acts until they are declared invalid. Id.; see generally T.C.
HARTI.rY, supra note 4, at 457-62.
7 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173(2).
8 See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. This Comment will only address one of the
three requirements an applicant must meet before his application for an annulment can be admitted
and the Court is able to consider the merits of voiding the Community act. Assuming the European
Court has jurisdiction, and the action is timely, the applicant must also show he has locusstatdi, the
right of appearance in the Court, before his application is admissible. T.C. HARrlEY, supra note 4.
at 39. In the ease of nonaddressees of a decision, the Treaty requires that the applicant be "directly
and individually concerned." EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 173(2). This Comment will analyze
how the Court has been interpreting this requirement and suggest a mode of analysis for determining
whether the applicant has locus standi.
')Unclear admissibility requirements generate uncertainty in the several ways. On the one
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The primary objective of this Comment is to help clarify the locus
standi requirement in order to reduce uncertainty. To meet this objective, this Comment will analyze how the European Court is interpreting
the locus standi requirement. The Comment will also suggest a mode of
analysis for determining whether an applicant is directly and individually
concerned by the legal act he is seeking to annul.
Clarification of the locus standi requirement may save legal re-

sources by enabling potential applicants to identify fruitless claims
early. 10 It is also hoped that such clarification will enable scholars to
rethink the locus standi requirement and how it affects the development
of the Community and its laws.11
I.
A.

DIRECT CONCERN

Direct Concern and Direct Applicability

Neither the European Court nor the Advocates General 12 have ex13
plicitly indicated the policy reasons for the direct concern requirement.
hand, litigious law firms or companies may risk petitioning the Court for an annulment and hope the
latter admits their application. This may result in fruitless claims consuming legal resources. On the
other hand, a potential litigant with a meritorious claim may decide not to institute annulment
proceedings because he is unable to predict satisfactorily his chance of success. The potential litigant
may choose a more costly alternative with more certainty or not bring an action at all. The latter
choice results in less public input on Community legislation. See generally Barav, Direct and Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrier to the Admissibility of Individual Appeal to the
EEC Court, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 191 (1974).
10 Philip Allott, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, has indicated that litigious American law
firms and corporations try to challenge Community Acts and expend legal resources despite the fact
that annulments of Community decisions are difficult to obtain from the Court. Lectures by Philip
Allott, Common Market Trade Law, Cambridge-Warsaw International Trade Law Program, Trinity
College, Cambridge, England, (July-August 1984) [hereinafter cited as Allott, Lectures].
II If the admissibility requirements are being interpreted too strictly, the Court may be reducing
popular input on Community legislation. This may be undesirable if the Community is striving
increasingly to become a federation. P. MATHIUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW,

226-43 (3d ed. 1980). Conversely, strict admissibility requirements may result in fewer challenges to
legislation and thereby preserve the fragile political compromises they represent. For a discussion of
the legal policies involved in annulment decisions, see Stein & Vining, Citizen Access to Judicial
Review of Administrative Action in a Transnational and Federal Context, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 219,
230-34 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Stein].
12 The Court of Justice is composed of two categories of members: Judges and Advocates General. The Judges decide the cases. The Advocate General does not participate in the decision but
orates an independent opinion on all the issues in a case and indicates how the Court should decide
it. His views are carefully considered by the Court. The Advocate General's opinion, which is
published after the Court's Opinion in the official reports, is especially persuasive and is cited authority when the Court is silent on an issue. The Advocate General may disagree with the Court on an
issue and his opinion may be used by scholars to criticize a Court decision. Dashwood, The Advocate General in the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2 LI'oAI. STuD. 202, 207-16
(1982).

13 It is clear that the function of the direct and individual concern requirement is to limit thal-
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One scholar has indicated that through the direct concern requirement
the Court and Advocates General have tried to "maintain the delicate
balance between member state and community power"' 4 or to "promote
[a] Community interest in preserving the discretion of member governments." 15 These explanations, however, are not very helpful because of
their vagueness.I 6
The European Court's test for determining whether direct concern
is present is not clear. The European Court has not consistently followed
the tests proposed by its Advocates General. For example, Advocate
General Roemer has argued that if the Member State had discretion in
implementing the decision, then the Community act was not of direct
deciconcern to the applicant and vice versa.' 7 The European Court's
8
sions have not consistently followed Mr. Roemer's reasoning.'
In fact, one scholar after examining the case law of the Court
through 1975 has stated that "one may question whether there is yet a
workable or meaningful doctrine of directness."' 9 He pointed out that it
is unclear whether Member State discretion is determinative of the issue.20 Moreover, if marginal discretion is permissible, how much discretion is permitted before direct concern is precluded?
It appears that through the direct concern requirement the European Court is trying to ensure that an independent Community legal act
is ultimately responsible for the alleged harm to the applicant. If a Community legal act is responsible for the alleged harm to the applicant, then
lenges by nonaddressees to those who meet these requirements. But the question asked here is: why
are these nonaddressees special? See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
14 Stein, supra note 11, at 227.
15 Id. at 229.
16 Moreover, the author does not indicate whether this is the exclusive Community interest to be
preserved by the direct concern requirement or whether there are other interests.
17 See, e.g., Toepfer v. Commission, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 405, 434, 1966 Common Mkt.
L.R. Ill.
18 Compare Toepfer, id. with Eridania v. Commission, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 459, [1967-70
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RaP. (CCH) 8099. In Toepfer, the Member State had discretion,
in theory, to use the Commission's authorization, but the Court ignored it and found direct concern
present. But in Eridania,the remote possibility that the Italian government would reject EEC subsidies for certain sugar refineries which Italy was committed to helping, led the Court to deny direct
effect because Italy had discretion. Accord Stein, supra note 11, at 227.
A broader view of direct concern was advanced by Advocate General Gand. He indicated that
when the intervention of the Member State is limited to a purely technical execution, the Community decision directly concerns the individual. Barav, supra note 9, at 193. The European Court
seemed to follow this view in Alcan Aluminum v. Commission, 170 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 385, 1970
Common Mkt. L.R. 337, and in Fruit Co. v. Commission, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 411, [1971-73
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RiFP. (CCH) 8142.
I'lStein, supra note I1,at 229.
20 Id.
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that natural or legal person's claim lies against the Council or Commission of the EEC. If a Community act is not responsible for the harm,
then the applicant must seek redress in the Member State courts.
This thesis is supported by the European Court's explicit use of the
concept of direct applicability when it decided the direct concern issue in
the Toepfer2 1 case and evidence that it was using this concept in other
cases.2 2 The European Court has used the concept of direct applicability
to establish the independence of Community law from Member State
law.2 3 In the context of analyzing EEC Treaty provisions, the European
Court has defined a directly applicable provision as one which "produce[s] direct and immediate effect within the national legal order and
assure[s] individual rights."'2 4 A directly applicable provision is one
which penetrates the legal system of the Member State.2 It is superior to
the law of the Member State and renders it inapplicable.2 6 Indeed, subse-

quent national legislation cannot modify or undermine the directly appli21 Toepfer v. Commission, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 405, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. I11.
22 See infra notes 42-93 and accompanying text. This thesis was also recognized, but not developed, in Barav, supra note 9, at 193-94.
23 p. MATHUSEN, supra note 11, at 227.
24 Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: The Development of a Community
Concept, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 257, 269 (1970). Like Dr. Bebr, this Comment assumes directly
applicable and direct effect mean the same thing. Other scholars limit the definition of direct applicability to those provisions which automatically become a part of the national legal system as soon as
promulgated by the Community authorities and require no national incorporation measures. See,
e.g., Winter, DirectApplicability andDirect Effect-Two Distinct andDifferent Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425, 438 (1972). They define "directly effective" provisions as
those which create rights for nationals which they can invoke in their own courts. See, e.g., P.
MATHIJSEN, supra note 11, at 228.
However, "the two expressions seem to be equivalent in the Court's language." Pescatore, The
Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 n.2 (1983).
Moreover, the tests for direct applicability in the limited sense are virtually the same as those for
direct effect and direct applicability in the broader sense. Automatically effective provisions are
unconditional, require no further executory measures, and do not give discretion to the Member
States. These are the tests of direct applicability in the sense used by Bebr and this Comment. For a
discussion of direct applicability see infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
Finally, the ultimate test of whether a Community provision creates effects within a national
legal order is whether it is justiciable and can be enforced by the courts. To be justiciable the legal
act must be unconditional and be sufficiently precise. Pescatore, supra, at 174. The tests discussed
infra reflect this fact.
25 A directly applicable treaty provision or regulation "does not have to be transformed into
national law by a national measure." P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 11, at 100.
26 "[B]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more
particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the
States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves."
Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593, 1964 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 455.
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cable provision.2 7

A Treaty provision or secondary legislation2 8 is directly applicable if
it is "complete and legally perfect." 2 9 A provision is "complete and legally perfect" if it is (1) clear or specific; (2) unconditional; (3) requires
no further measures either on the part of the Member States or of the
Community institutions; and (4) if further measures are necessary, Member States may have practically no discretion in taking them. 0
Through its case law, the European Court has indicated how it applies the "complete and legally perfect test." When applying this test,
the European Court considers the "whole" provision. It considers the
spirit, structure, and wording of the provision. Indeed, the actual text of
the provision may play a limited role in the Court's analysis. 3!
Under the first element, the "clear" requirement, negative provisions or provisions prohibiting a Community institution, Member State,
or natural and legal person from performing an act are likely to be found
to be clear. Yet, negative provisions must be sufficiently precise to indicate what actions are no longer allowed and provide criteria for identifying such actions.32 Indeed, the limits of the prohibition must be clear.
Positive provisions or provisions requiring an entity to take an affirmative act must also be sufficiently clear to specify what actions must be
taken.
The second requirement, that the provision be "unconditional," is
closely related to the third and fourth elements.3 3 A provision cannot
have immediate effect within a national order or create a right for a national if it depends on something within the control of an independent
body.
In sum, a provision is unconditional if it has automatic
effectiveness.
The third element of "no further necessary measures" is fulfilled if
27 This obligation stems from EEC Treaty, art. 5, which provides, interalia, that Member States
"shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the
Treaty." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at 17, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 11181.
28 "Secondary legislation" means regulations, directives, decisions.
29 Bebr, supra note 24, at 268.
3o id. at 270.
31 Id. at 269.
32 Id. at 270.
33 This close relationship is illustrated by how Judge Pescatore described determining whether a
provision is unconditional:
It is necessary to consider in each individual case whether there may be some reservation, inherent either in the provision itself or in the system of which it is part. with a view to further
implementing measures implying some discretion, to be taken either by one of the Communily
Institutions or by Member States.
Pescatore, supra note 24, at 174.
34 T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 4, at 193.
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the Community institutions or Member States have already taken any
necessary executory actions." Negative provisions generally meet this
requirement since they prohibit any further actions. Positive provisions
may also meet this requirement if the affirmative actions required are
only secondary or formalistic measures to be taken. If the further obligations are very specific and nondiscretionary, the European Court will dispense with them and find this element fulfilled.3 6 Also, if the mere
omission of a secondary measure would undermine a fundamental provision of Community law, the Court is likely to ignore these secondary
measures.

37

Finally, under the fourth element, the European Court and Advocates General have recognized that marginal discretion does not necessarily prevent a provision from being directly applicable. Only a certain
"actual or real discretion will preclude direct applicability. ' 38 Real discretion exists if the Treaty or secondary legislation expressly provides for
it.3 9 Real discretion may also exist if the provision has no specific objective which inherently limits discretion or if it does not provide methods
or criteria for performing an act.'
To the extent that the direct concern requirement aims at determining whether an independent Community act is responsible for the alleged
harm to the applicant, the "complete and legally perfect" test of direct
applicability could be employed to determine direct concern. To the extent that an immediately effective decision or decision in the form of a
regulation clearly requires an entity to refrain from or to perform a nondiscretionary act, it is a directly applicable decision, which penetrates the
national sphere and has the potential of harming an applicant. Thus, if
the applicant can show that the legal act meets the "complete and legally" perfect test, then the European Court is likely to find direct concern. The following cases contain evidence that the European Court is
applying the direct applicability test when analyzing the direct concern
issue.4 '
B.

Decisions Addressed to a Member State

In its opinion in Toepfer v. Commission,42 the European Court ex35 Id. at 196.
36 Bebr, supra note 24, at 275.
37 Id. at 276.
38 Id. at 278.
39 Pescatore, supra note 24, at 175.
4) Bcbr, supra note 24, at 280-81.
41 See infra notes 42-93 and accompanying text.
42 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 405, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. 111.
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plicitly employed the concept of direct applicability to decide the direct
concern issue, thereby indicating there is a close relationship between the
two concepts. In this case, the EEC's elaborate Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP)4 3 in cereals was involved. Pursuant to Regulation 19 of the
CAP in cereals, a Member State which fears that cereal imports from
other Member States will disrupt its own market may implement protective safeguards. The Member State authorities must notify the Commission of the measures taken. Upon notice, the Commission must decide
whether the protective measures are to be retained, amended, or abolished within four working days. Article 22 of Regulation 19 provides
44
that the Commission's decision shall come into force immediately.
The German authorities implemented various safeguards, including
denying Toepfer's import license application, because the EEC failed to
schedule a tariff on cereals for October 1st and the Germans feared excessive imports. They notified the Commission of their actions pursuant to
Regulation 19 and the Commission validated the safeguards through a
decision addressed to the German import authority. 45 Toepfer challenged the Commission's decision validating the import authority's denial of his import license application filed on October 1st.
The European Court held that since the Commission's decision validating the protective measures taken by the West German authorities
went into effect immediately, it was directly applicable and thereby of
direct concern to the applicants. 46 In its holding, the Court was indicating implicitly that the tests of direct applicability were fulfilled. Indeed,
since the Commission's decision went into effect immediately, it was unconditional and did not require any further implementing measures by
the Commission itself or the West German authorities. Thus, the "unconditional" and "no further measures" tests were met.
Moreover, through its citation to the various provisions of Regulation 19, the Court was indicating that it was clear that the Commission
43 Through the CAP, the EEC is trying to overcome the varying natural resource endowments
and climates of the Member States and (1) create a single market for agricultural goods, within the
EEC; (2) establish a unified trading front against non-EEC countries; and (3) assure its farmers an
adequate income. Allott Lectures, supra note 10. See generally Note, American AgriculturalExports
and the EEC's Common AgriculturalPolicy (CAP), 1982 Wis. INT'L. L.J. 133, 134: P. MATHIJSEN,
supra note 11, at 139.
44 Toepfer, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 411, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. at 141.
45 Id. at 412, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. at 142.
46 The Court stated:
The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 22 provides that the Commission's decision
shall come into force immediately. Therefore a decision of the Commission amending or abolishing protective measures is directly applicable and concerns interested parties subject to it as
directly as the measures which it replaces.
Id. at 411, 1966 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 142 (emphasis added).
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was responsible for the decisions made in this area and that its obligations were specific.4 7 Hence, only Community law was involved in

Toepfer.
Advocate General Roemer's opinion explicitly mentioned two of the
direct applicability tests in addressing the direct concern issue. Mr. Roemer indicated that there could be no direct concern when a Member
State has (1) discretion to take (2) acts to implement the Commission's
decision.48 Mr. Roemer argued that the German authorities had discretion to apply the validated safeguards in this case and consequently there
was no direct concern. The Court rejected this argument, holding that
validation of the safeguards had the same effect as if they had been abolished.49 If the measures had been abolished, the German authorities
could not have used them and they would have had no discretion in the
matter. Thus, the validation of the safeguards resulted in the applicant
being directly concerned.
An applicant may also be directly concerned if the Member State
seeks authorization for a protective measure it has not yet employed, and
the Member State unequivocally informs the applicant that it intends to
employ such protective measure once a Community institution authorizes it. In Bock v. Commission,50 the applicants contested the Commission's decision authorizing the German authorities to exclude from
Community treatment" Chinese mushrooms already circulating among
the Member States. For a variety of reasons, the West German authorities requested permission to exclude the mushrooms from Community
treatment pursuant to Article 115 of the EEC Treaty. Article 115 provides that if the Commission fails to obtain cooperation among the Member States when deflection of trade occurs, "it shall authorize the
Member State to take the necessary protective measures, the conditions
and details of which it shall determine."52
The only issue which was contested by the Commission in the direct
concern inquiry was whether the German authorities had the discretion
not to apply the protective measure-denying the applicant's import
47 Id.
48 Id. at 434, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. at 116-17.
49 The Court stated "it would be illogical to say that a decision to retain protective measures
had a different effect, as the latter type of decision does not merely give approval to such measures, but renders them valid."
Id. at 411, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. at 142.
50 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 897, 1972 Common Mkt. L.R. at 160.
51 The Treaty of Rome requires that Member States treat goods from other Member States in the
same manner as their domestic goods. E.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 1,art. 95, at 53, 1 COMMON
Mwr.R.P. (CCH) 113001 (prohibits discriminatory taxation).
52 EEC Treaty, supra note 1,art. 115, at 60, 2 COMMON MKT. Ri.i. (CCH) 1 3888.
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licenses-after they were given authorization by the Commission. The
Court took a nonformalistic approach and held that there was no discretion since the German authorities had already informed the applicants
that they would reject their application as soon as the Commission
granted them authorization.5
The fact that the German authorities unequivocally informed the
applicant that they would employ the authorized measure may have led
the European Court to treat this as a validation case similar to Toepfer.
The German authority's communication effectively put the safeguard
measure in place and the Commission validated it. As in Toepfer, once
the measure was validated, the German authorities lacked the discretion
not to employ it.
The Court may also have applied its test for determining whether an
act of the Council or Commission is reviewable 54 to the import authority
in this case. The Court has held that when the Council or Commission
makes a definite and unequivocal statement that it intends to take an
action, it may be challenged and reviewed by the Court even though it is
possible the institution may not take the action. 5 In Toepfer, the Court
may have considered the import authority's rejection communication to
be a reviewable act. The Court then attributed the act to the Commission once it validated the communications. Thus, the applicant was directly concerned.
C.

Decisions in the Form of Regulations

The European Court actually used the labels of the elements of the
direct applicability test when it addressed the direct concern issue in
FruitCo. v. Commission. 6 Because of disruptions in the common market
in dessert apples, the European Commission established a licensing system so that it could control the import of dessert apples into the Community. Under this system, the Member States were to collect applications
for import licenses for dessert apples and notify the Commission each
53 The Court stated:
The appropriate German authorities had nevertheless already informed the applicant that they
would reject its application as soon as the Commission had granted them the requisite
authorization.
They had requested that authorization with particular reference to the applications already
before them at that time.
It follows therefore that the matter was of direct concern to the applicant.
Bock, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 908, 1972 Common Mkt. L.R. at 170-71.
54 T.C. HARTt.FY, supra note 4, at 330.
55 Id. at 344.
56 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 411, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. Rt. (CCII)
8142.
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week of the quantity of apples requested and for what time periods. The
Commission would make licensing decisions based on this information.
Soon thereafter, another regulation was issued that indicated that
the Commission would make its decision on the basis of a formula. 7
The Member States were required to gather the data and make the necessary calculations for this formula. The regulation specifically stated that
the Commission "shall assess the situation and decide on the issue of
licenses." 58
The Commission rejected the plaintiff's import license application
because he had exceeded his import allotment under the formula. The
applicant was notified of the Commission's decision through the German
authorities. The applicant contested the Commission's decision.
In holding that direct concern was present in this case, the Court
employed the direct applicability tests. After describing the system established by the Commission, the Court said, "it is clear from the system
introduced by Regulation 459, and particularly from Article 2(2) thereof,
that the decision on the grant of import licenses is a matter for the Commission. '"" The Court also noted that according to this regulation, the
"Commission alone is competent to assess the economic situation in light
of which the grant of import licenses must be justified." 60 Thus, the
Court indicated that the Commission's obligations were "clear."
Furthermore, the Court addressed the "unconditional" and "no further necessary measures" requirements simultaneously. It held that Regulation 459 did not leave the national authorities any discretion in the
matter of the issue of licenses or the conditions on which the applications
were to be granted. 6 The Court noted that the Member States' duties
were merely to collect the data required by the Commission and subsequently to notify the applicant of the Commission's decision.6 2 Since
these duties were very specific and did not give the Member State any
discretion, the Court did not consider the acts significant enough to prevent a finding of "no further necessary measures" under its directly applicable analysis. Thus, the directly applicable requirements were met in
57 [E]ach application was to be granted in full, subject to the proviso that no importer could
import more apples in any one month than the number he imported in the corresponding month
of the previous year (or, if it was greater, the average for the corresponding months of the years
1967-69). T.C. HARTLFY, supra note 4, at 361.
58 Fruit Co., 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. at 421, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON Mwr. Rm'.

(CCH) 1 8142, at 7628.
59 Id. at 422, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RLP. (CCH)
added).
60

Id.

61 Id.
62 Id.

8142, at 7628 (emphasis
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this case: Community law was involved, not Member State law.63
In the Exportation des Sucres v. Commission' case, it was so clear
that Community law was involved, that the Court did not fully address

the direct concern issue in its opinion. Under the CAP in sugar, the
Community was subsidizing its exporters of sugar when the world market price in sugar was depressed. An exporter could fix the amount of his

subsidy in his national currency in advance if he held an offer to tender
sugar at the time he applied for his license. A regulation provided that
should the parity relationship between the Member State's currency and
the Community's unit of account6 5 change, transactions with fixed subsidies which have not been consummated could be adjusted.66 Another
regulation added that holders of subsidy certificates could cancel them if
they were disadvantaged by the change in parity.6 7

As a result of currency parity changes and a fear that widespread
cancellations of refund certificates would disrupt its administration of the

market, the Commission decided to abolish the right of cancellation of
certificates issued within a specific time period. 8 Instead, the Commission would compensate the exporters according to a fixed schedule. 9

The applicants in Exportation des Sucres challenged the Commission's
decision to abolish their right to cancel their license refund certificates if
the refunds became disadvantageous as a result of a change in parity between their national currency and the Community's unit of account
currency.
In this case the Court was dealing with various regulations which

according to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty are directly applicable.7" The
63 Advocate General Roemer arrived at the same conclusion as the Court. He used a phrase
associated with direct applicability to express it-"we can draw a parallel with the Toepfer case in
saying that the Community measure penetrated directly into the national sphere." Id. at 435, [197173 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8142, at 7636.
64 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 709, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8418.
65 A measure which serves as a Community-wide currency. It is fixed annually by the Council
for different products. Allott Lectures, supra note 10.
66 Exportation des Sucres, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 724, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8418, at 7491.
67

Id.

68 Id. at 725, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8418, at 7491-92.
69 Subsequently, the Commission amended its schedule. The decision to amend the schedule
was challenged in Toepfer v. Commission, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1019, [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. RE'. (CCH) 1 8488. The applicant was initially entitled to DM 2.33 per
100 kilograms of sugar. The Commission changed this compensation to DM 1.82 per 100 kilograms
of sugar. The Advocate General referred to the opinion in Exportation des Sucres for its discussion
of the direct concern issue. Id. at 1034, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MK-T. Ri'. (CCH)
8488, at 8790.
70 See EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 189, at 78-9, 2 COMMON MKT. R.I'. (CCH) 4901.
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regulations clearly specify that the Commission was responsible for the
administration of subsidies. Since the Member States merely determined
the amount of the subsidy according to a predetermined formula, the
Court probably viewed these acts as secondary acts. They were very specific and did not grant the Member State any discretion. Thus, the directly applicable requirements were met here.7 a
An elaborate Community regulatory scheme was also involved in
Simmenthal v. Commission.72 As a result of falling meat prices and increasing imports of meat into the Community, the Commission, which
initially did not impose any duties on frozen meat entering the Community in order to help its meat processing industry, decided to link the
granting of import licenses for meat to the licensee obtaining a purchase
contract for frozen meat with an intervention agency. 73 Under this linking system, an intervention agency74 announced that it is accepting bids
from qualified importers for a minimum quantity of meat in its possession. At the close of the bidding, the intervention agency submitted the
bids to the Commission. Upon receipt of the bids, the Commission set
the minimum bid for each agency according to Member State and category of meat. The individual intervention agencies then notified their
bidders of the results and consummated any contracts.
The applicants challenged the Commission's decision to set the minimum bid price for frozen meat held by the intervention agencies at a
price above their bid. Since the applicants were unsuccessful in obtaining
a contract with the intervention agency, they were also ineligible to obtain a license to import meat which was conditioned upon obtaining a
meat contract with the intervention agency.
The Commission stipulated to a finding of direct concern in this
case.7" It is clear that the Commission is responsible for determining
who will obtain a contract with an intervention agency and thereby qualify for an import license through its setting of the minimum price. It was
the Commission's responsibility to fix a price which would "ensure that
the predetermined quantity of meat held by the intervention agencies was
71 Since the category of exporter affected by the decision was clearly specified, this decision may
have per se concerned the exporters. Addressees of decisions per se have standing to challenge the
decision. EEC TRE1ATY, supra note 1, art. 173(2).
72 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 777, 1980[1] Common Mkt. L.R. 25.

73 Id. at 794, 1980[l] Common Mkt. L.R. at 51.
74 Part of the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy is to insure farmers a minimum price for their
products. When market price for a good falls below a minimum price, intervention agencies
purchase the goods on the open market to raise its price. The intervention agencies then use various
mechanisms to sell the goods without lowering market price. Allott Lectures, supra note 10.
75 Simmenthal, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. at 797, 198011] Common Mkt. L.R. at 53.
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disposed at the most profitable prices for them."7 6 The Court indicated
77
the minimum price was set by the Commission alone.
The Commission's minimum price went into effect immediately and
was not conditional upon any acts of the Member States. The Court also
held that the intervention agencies were only "acting as agents for the
purpose of collecting [bids] and notifying the participants of the result."' 78 The Court indicated that the intervention agencies had some discretion concerning subsidiary matters but these did not affect its finding
79
of direct concern.
A decision addressed to the Member States was also involved in
Control Data Belgium v. Commission." Control Data Belgium, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Control Data Corporation of the United
States, challenged a Commission decision which declared that the two
models of computers it sold were not scientific instruments and thereby
ineligible for importation duty-free into the Community. 1
Under Article 7 of Regulation 1798, the individual Member State is
competent to grant an instrument duty-free status under the Community's exemption for scientific instruments if it has adequate information
to make the decision. If it does not have adequate information to make
the decision, the Member State refers the decision to the Commission. If
there is any dispute among the Member States about whether the instrument is a scientific instrument, the matter is referred to the Commission's
Committee on Duty-Free Arrangements. On the basis of the Committee's decision, the Commission is directed to make a decision and notify
the Member States.
The Commission did not raise the direct concern issue in this case,
and the Court did not address it.8 2 It is clear that Community law was
involved in this case. On the one hand, the Member State could make
the exemption decision pursuant to the Community's regulations. The
Member State would have no discretion in the matter; it would have to
apply Community law. On the other hand, in the event of a dispute, the
regulations specify that the Commission is to make the decision pursuant
83
to the advice of the Committee on Duty-Free Arrangements.
76 Id. at 797, 1980[l] Common Mkt. L.R. at 54.
77 Id. at 798, 1980[] Common Mkt. L.R. at 54.
78 Id.
7') These subsidiary matters included the system of invitation to tender and the conclusion and
performance of contracts of sale. Id. at 798, 1980[l] Common Mkt. L.R. at 55.
8) 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 911, 1983[2] Common Mkt. L.R. 357.
81 Id. at 924, 1983[2] Common Mkt. L.R. at 373.
82 Id. at 927, 1983[2] Common Mkt. L.R. at 375.
83 Id. at 926, 1983[2] Common Mkt. L.R. at 374.
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Advocate General Slynn did address the direct applicability requirements in this case. He stated that the Member States applied the decision
automatically, thereby indicating that it was unconditional.84 Moreover,
he indicated that the Commission did not need to take any further measures to implement the decision," hence the "no further measure" requirement was met here. Mr. Slynn dismissed the defense that since the
Member State still needed to notify the applicant of the Commission's
decision, it was not a final decision.8 6 Mr. Slynn argued that accepting
this defense would be "taking the Court's decisions on this requirement
too far."8" Implicit in his statement is the fact that the notification requirement was of secondary importance and would not preclude the
Court from finding the applicant directly concerned.
D.

Decisions Addressed to Private Individuals

The Court expressly stated that Community rules alone were involved in the "Ball Bearing" 88 litigation when it addressed the direct
concern issue. In that litigation, four major Japanese ball bearing producers, their subsidiaries, and exclusive importers challenged a Community
regulation which required the Member States to collect provisional antidumping duties from the applicants and suspended the collection of a
general anti-dumping duty on their products. The regulations involved
in these case were passed after the Council formally investigated the alleged dumping practices of the applicants. Since the four major Japanese
ball bearing producers were addressed in the regulations, they wereperse
concerned by them. Thus, their applications were admissible.8 9
Furthermore, the Court found that the exclusive importers were
also directly concerned by the anti-dumping measures, 90 despite the fact
that unlike the producers, they were not mentioned in the regulation.
The Court noted that anti-dumping regulations are the exclusive provid. at 937-8, 198312] Common Mkt. L.R. at 366.
85 Id.
84

86 Id.

87 Id.
8H NTN Toyo Bearing Company v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, 1979[2J Common
Mkt. L.R. 257; I.S.O. v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1277. 1979[2] Common Mkt. L.R. 257;
Nippon Seiko v. Council and Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1303. 1979[2] Common Mkt.
L.R. 257; Koyo Seiko v. Council and Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1337, 1979[2] Common Mki. L.R. 257; Naehi Fujikoshi v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1363, 1979[2] Common
Mkt. L.R. 257.
8, E.g., NTN Toyo BearingCo., 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1205. 1979[2] Common Mkt. L.R.
at 335.
')t I..g.. LO., 1979 H. Comm. CI. J. Rep. 1277, 197912] Common Mkt. L.R. 257.
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ince of the Council, so national laws were not involved. 9 Moreover, the
Court held that the regulations were unconditional since they were applied by the Member States automatically. 92 In applying these regulations, the Member States had no discretion because the amount of duty
they were to collect was specified in the regulations.93
E.

Conclusion

The European Court appears to be applying the "complete and legally perfect" test of direct applicability to determine if an applicant is
directly concerned by the decision he seeks to annul. Thus, the potential
applicant should examine the wording, structure and spirit of the provision to see if it is "complete and legally perfect." He should consider
whether the provision is aper se validation of a Member State's action or
an authorization which is in effect a validation. To the extent that the
provision is "complete and legally perfect" or a validation, it is likely that
it directly concerns the applicant.
II.

INDIVIDUAL CONCERN

Again, neither the European Court nor the Advocates General have
explicitly stated the policy reasons for the individual concern requirement. Scholars have expressed their views which fail to satisfactorily explain the policy reasons behind the requirement. 9a Unlike the case of the
direct concern requirement, however, the European Court has expressed
the test for individual concern.
Since the Plaumann v. Commission95 decision, the European Court
has expressed the test for determining individual concern in the following
boilerplate:
persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed can justifiably
91 Id. at 1294, 197912] Common Mkt. L.R. at 335.
92

Id.

93 Id. at 1293, 1979[2] Common Mkt. L.R. at 334.
94 For example, Stein has suggested that through the individual concern requirement the European Court is looking for "whether or not a private and established legal right is at stake in the
case." Stein, supra note 11, at 240. He argues that it is analogous to the old "vested right" test of
United States common law standing. A "vested right" has been defined as "one of property, one
arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers a privilege." Id. at 236.

However, the European Court seems to have incorporated this concept into its doctrine of
reviewable acts and not necessarily in the requirement of individual concern. An act ofthe Community is reviewable only if it produces legal effects. An act has legal effect if it alters a person's legal
position; if "[it] produces] a change in somebody's rights and obligations." T.C. HARTI.EY, supra
note 4, at 332-44.
,5 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 95, 1964 Common Mkt. L.R. 29.
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claim to be individually concerned only if the decision affects them by reason of certain characteristics which are peculiar to them or by reason of a
factual situation which is, as compared to all other persons, relevant to
described in a way
them and by reference to which they may be individually
96
similar to that of the addressee of the decision.
This formula is not enlightening. 97 After reading it, one is left with the
question-just what are the characteristics or fact situations that individualize a natural or legal person?98
It appears that once the Court has determined that an independent
Community legal act is involved in an annulment proceeding, 99 it wants
to ensure that the nonaddressee has an interest to sue or is individually
concerned by the independent act(s). The Court seems to find this interest if the applicant effectively has a per se interest to sue-that is if the
applicant was effectively the addressee of the challenged Community
legal act."°° The Court has found that Community acts addressed to entities other than the applicant in effect do concern the applicant in four
factual situations. A Commission or Council decision individually concerns a nonaddressee if (1) the Community institution knew or should
have known its decision would affect the applicant since the latter was in
an ascertainable group; 0 1 (2) the Community institution was really making a bundle of individual decisions and just issued the decision in the
form of a regulation;10 2 (3) the nonaddressee was in a sufficiently close
association with the addressee; 0 3 or (4) the adjudication of the nonaddressee's claim would facilitate a satisfactory administration of justice."°4
A. Ascertainable Group
In this group of cases, the Council or Commission made a retroactive decision. Advocate General Roemer has analogized such decisions
to collective decisions as developed in German administrative law.
"They are classed administrative measures, because it is ultimately possible to ascertain which persons they concern.' ' O5
96 Id. at 107, 1964 Common Mkt. L.R. at 47.
97 Stein, supra note 11, at 224.
98 Others have already asked this question. Id.
' The Court does not always address the direct concern issue first. Sometimes it addresses
individual concern first if it is easier. If the applicant fails to meet either requirement, his case is not
admissible.
ItX
) See infra notes 105-62 and accompanying text.
10l See infra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
I02 See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 136-56 and accompanying text.
104 See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
105 To pffer v. Commission, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 405, 439, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. 11I,
122.
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When the Commission decided on October 4th to validate the German import authority's denial of the applicant's license request because
of zero levies for cereal imports prevailing on October 1st in Toepfer, 10 6 it
had already established a new set of levies effective on October 2nd. The
danger of excessive imports caused by zero levies had passed on October
2nd. Thus, when it validated the safeguards of the German authorities,
the Commission was determining the fate of October 1st license applicants since they were the only individuals eligible for the zero levy rate.
The Court held that within the three days following its establishment of a new levy schedule, the Commission was in a position to ascertain who would be affected by its validation decision because the number
of applicants had become fixed. 107 The retroactivity of its decision made
to determine which applicant's legal posiit possible for the Commission
08
tion would be affected.1
Advocate General Roemer also added that the October 1st applicants had distinguished themselves from all other potential applicants on
that day. The October 1st applicants had undertaken burdens which distinguished them from all abstract applicants: they had completed the
required import license applications and had entered contracts with exporters.109 Thus, the applicant in Toepfer was individually concerned.
The fact that the Commission was in a position to know that it was
deciding the fate of certain applicants also weighed heavily in the Court's
finding of individual concern in Bock v. Commission.'1 0 Several factors
influenced the Court's decision that the Commission knew or should
have known that it was affecting the fate of the applicant. As in Toepfer,
the decision in Bock was retroactive, fixing the number of applicants and
enabling the Commission to ascertain who they were. The Commission
authorized the protective measures taken by the German authorities on
September 15th for applications already pending before the German authorities on September 1lth."' Thus, the number of applicants was fixed
and ascertainable.
Moreover, the decision itself contained language from which the
German authorities could reasonably conclude that it was intended to
cover the applications which had already been submitted and were pend106 Id.; see supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.

107 Thepfir, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 411, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. at 142.
1O Normally, the German import authorities had no power to refuse an import license application if properly completed and submitted. T.C. HARIL.IEY, supra note 4, at 369.
10,) 'bepfer, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 439, 1966 Common Mkt. L.R. at 123.
o 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 897, 908, 1972 Common Mkt. L.R. 160, 171.
1 Id. at 908, 1972 Common Mkt. L.R. at 170.
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ing before them.1 12 The decision approved the safeguards taken by the
German authorities and stated that it "likewise covers imports of these
products in respect of which applications for licenses are currently and
duly pending before the German authorities."1'13 The Commission's
elaborate argument to the contrary was rejected. 1 4
The Advocate General pointed out additional evidence that the
Commission knew that it was determining the fate of the applicants. He
noted that the German authorities referred to one application specifically
and alluded to others in their request to the Commission for the safeguards. 5' Indeed, the applicants' legal position was affected since they
no longer had the right to import dessert apples for that time period.
The applicants in Ilford SpA v. Commission1 6 also contested the
Commission's authorization of protective measures taken by a Member
State. On October 15, the Italian Republic lodged an application pursuant to Article 115 of the EEC Treaty to exclude from Community treatment color film originating in Japan. Italy also sought authorization for
applying the protective measures to the applications for imports already
before it.
The Commission granted this authorization on October 20th, retroactively making it applicable to all applications pending before the Italian authorities since October 4th. The plaintiffs lodged their applications
with the Italian authorities on October 13th. Thus, the Commission's
retroactive decision applied to them.
The Court found the applicant was individually concerned.11 7 The
retroactivity of the Commission's decision enabled it to determine who
would be affected by its decision since the number of applicants from
October 5th to October 20th was fixed. The Court held that this fact was
sufficient to individualize the applicants and it cited the Bock decision.t tI
The applicants were also distinguished from all other potential importers
on October 13th because they had undertaken the burden of completing
applications, a fact which the Court did not mention in its opinion.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 907, 1972 Common Mkt. L.R. at 169-70.
114 The Commission tried to argue that the "words 'currently and duly pending' exclude applications for import licenses which the German authorities ought already to have granted before the
entry into force oF the contested decision ....
Id. at 907, 1972 Common Mkt. L.R. at 170.
115 Id. at 914, 1972 Common Mkt. L.R. at 164.
116 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 423, 198412] Common Mkt. L.R. 475.
117 ld. at 427-28, 1984[2] Common Mkt. L.R. at 479.
118 d.
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Bundles of Individual Decisions

In the following cases the Commission's decision was either in the
form of a regulation or a decision addressed to numerous Member States.
Despite the general abstractness of the decision, the Commission was in
fact making a bundle of individual decisions. On that basis and other
factors, the Court was able to find individual concern.
In the regulatory scheme involved in the Fruit Company case 1 19, the
Commission was granting or denying license applications on the basis of
a formula.120 Through this formula, the Commission was effectively deciding the fate of each applicant even though it only took account of the
total quantity of dessert apples requested. Indeed, the Court held that
the Commission was making "a conglomeration of individual decisions
under the guise of a regulation.., each of which decision12affects the legal
position of each author of an application for a license." 1
Further individualization was involved in this case because of the
retroactive nature of the decision. Through its May 28th decision, the
Commission extended the effectiveness of the Community licensing procedures for the importation of dessert apples until May 22nd. The applicants submitted their license application on May 13th. Again, the
that the number of
retroactivity of this decision led the Court to hold
12 2
applications affected was fixed and ascertainable.
Indeed, the Advocate General noted that, just as in the Toepfer case,
the applicants had distinguished themselves individually by completing
the necessary application procedures. Furthermore, the Commission's
decision affected the individual legal position of the applicants because
became
they were denied the opportunity to import apples and possibly
23
liable under the import contracts they had already entered.
The contested regulation in the Exportation des Sucres case, 24 abolished the right of exporters to cancel their refund certificates which became disadvantageous because of currency fluctuations.' 25 However,
this seemingly general regulation was only applicable to refund certifiI" 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 411, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. Rio'I. (CCH) 11
8142.
120 Se' supra note 57.
121 Eruif Co., 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. at 422. [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKr. Ri.
(CCH) 1 8142, at 7628.
122 id.
123 hI at 435, [1971-73 Transfer IBinderi COMMON MK'. Ri.'. (CCIH) II 8142. at 7636.
(CCII) 11
124 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 709, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKr. Ri:i,.
8418.
125 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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cates issued before March 15th and not used before July 1st. t26 The
Court's language could be interpreted as indicating that this specificity
12 7
resulted in the license holders being per se individually concerned.
Moreover, since the applicants fixed their refunds in advance, they distinguished themselves from all other persons and effectively were the addressees of the regulation.1 2 8 Indeed, their legal position was changed.
The Toepfer v. Commission case129 basically dealt with the same regulations that were involved in the Exportation des Sucres case. Concurrent with its decision to abolish the right of cancellation for holders of
white sugar refund certificates, the Commission provided compensation
for those affected according to a fixed schedule. Subsequently, the Commission developed a new method for calculating the compensation for
white sugar refund certificate holders and changed the compensation
amounts in its schedule.
The applicant held a license with a refund certificate issued in the
period specified in the regulation, and his right of cancellation had been
abolished. Consequently, he was entitled to a particular compensation
amount under the Commission's initial schedule.13 Subsequent changes
The applicant
in the schedule, however, reduced his compensation.'
challenged the reduction in his compensation.
The European Court found the applicant eligible to challenge the
decision to reduce his compensation amount because he was directly and
individually concerned. 3 2 Referring to Exportation des Sucres, the
Court found that the applicant was individually concerned by the Commission's decision to abolish his cancellation rights. Consequently, the
Commission's decision to change his compensation only further changed
his legal position.' 3 3
The Court also found a conglomeration of individual decisions in
126 Exportation des Sucres, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 725, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] ComMON MKT. Ri.'. (CCH) 8418, at 7491.
127 The court stated, "[o]n the other, the traders are distinguished individually by tie fact that
they obtained, for the product in question, advance fixing in licenses issued before 15 March 1976
and still valid on 1 July 1976." Id., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MK'r. Rlio. (CCH) II8418.
at 7492.
128 Id.
129 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 1019, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. Rio,. (CCH) 1
8488.
130 The compensation fixed initially for white sugar for West Germany was DM 2.33 per 100
kilograms. Id.at 1029, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. Ri,. (CCH) 18488. at 8787.
131 The new compensation amount for white sugar for West Germany was DM 1.87 per 100
kilograms. Id.
132 Id.at 1030, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MK'r. Rio,. (CCH) I1
8488, at 8787.
133 Id., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKr. Rio'. (CCH) 1 8488, at 8788.
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Simmenthal v. Commission.13 4 In this case, the Commission determined
the minimum price for categories of frozen meat held by the intervention
agencies in the Member States for which bids had been submitted. For
Italy, the Commission set the minimum price of 1.601 units of account
per ton. This price was above the bid submitted by the applicants and
thus they were ineligible to consummate a contract with the agency.
The Court held that by determining a minimum selling price, the
Commission determined that the applicant's bid would be rejected.' 35
Thus, the applicant was individually concerned by the decision. This
decision also had a retroactive element. The applicant submitted his bid
on January 20th. The Commission determined the minimum price on
February 15th. Thus, the number of bids was fixed and the applicants
were readily ascertainable.
C.

Sufficiently Associated With the Addressee

The European Court has found individual concern where the applicant is "sufficiently closely associated with the natural or legal person
addressed." 13 6 The Court has found the subsidiaries, exclusive importers, distributors, and coordinators of a parent company individually concerned when the parent company or subsidiary is the addressee. 3 7
In the "Ball Bearing"' 3 8 cases, the European Court found the four
major Japanese producers and their subsidiaries individually concerned.
The third article of the regulation contested in these cases imposed a
provisional anti-dumping duty on the products of the major Japanese
producers. 39 Thus, it was clear that the parent companies were per se
individually concerned. Moreover, the Court held that the parent company and its subsidiaries were sufficiently closely related that there was
no need to distinguish between them on the question of whether they
were individually concerned by the regulation." Thus, either the parent
or the subsidiary were in a position to challenge the regulation.
The Court came to this conclusion on the basis of the fact that the
Commission, during the course of its dumping investigation, applied the
special provisions concerning export prices of Article 3(3) of Regulation
134 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 777, 1980[1] Common Mkt. L.R. 25.
135 Id. at 798, 198011] Common Mkt. L.R. at 54.
136 See infra notes 138-56 and accompanying text.
'37 Id.

138 See supra note 88.

13) i g., NTN Toyo v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, 1240, 1979[2] Common Mkt.
L.R. 257, 293-94.
140 Id. at 1204, 1979[2] Common Mkt. L.R. at 334.
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459. 4 This provision calls for establishing the true export price of a
product suspected of being dumped into the Community at the price sold
to the first independent buyer "where it appears that the export price is
unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between exporter and the importer." 4 z The Commission found that the
subsidiaries were not independent buyers. Thus, the parent and subsidiary were considered as one seller. The Court used this same provision of
Regulation 459 to justify its finding that an exclusive importer of one
major producer was individually concerned by the regulation addressed
to the producer in I.S.O. v. Council.'43

A factor with more precedential value for finding a sufficiently close
association between a nonaddressee and an addressee than Regulation
459 was involved in Control Data Belgium v. Commission.'" There, a
subsidiary challenged the Commission's decision refusing to grant its
computer duty-free status as a scientific instrument. The Commission
argued that the subsidiary was not individually concerned by this decias the manufacturer of the computer
sion, but that its parent company
145
was individually concerned.
The Court rejected this argument. It noted that the subsidiary was
wholly-owned by the manufacturer and that since the subsidiary was the
sole importer of this product in Belgium, there was a very close relation
between the subsidiary and the parent. 46 Moreover, since the subsidiary
initiated the procedures which led to the Commission's decision not to
grant its computers duty-free status and ultimately to the annulment probe pure formalism to require the
ceedings, the Court held that it would
147
parent company to bring the action.
The Advocate General also raised a number of arguments which
tended to indicate that the Commission was effectively addressing its decision to the subsidiary. First, the Commission only considered the computer models of the subsidiary. 48 Second, the subsidiary's models were
likely to be distinguishable from another manufacturer's computer models since computers are not fungible goods like agricultural products.,'4'
Finally, the potential number of addressees was limited and ascertain141
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able. There was no indication that the parent company was going to
form more subsidiaries or grant distribution licenses to other entities in
the Community.1 5 These factors further individualized the Commission's decision in the form of a regulation.
Arguably, given the unique model of the computer involved and the
fact that the subsidiary initiated the duty-free application procedure, the
Commission knew that its decision would determine the fate of the applicant. It appears that this decision was very specific and was only communicated to the remainder of the Community for efficiency and notice
reasons. Thus, the subsidiary was individually concerned.
A corporate entity which coordinated the activities of the subsidiaries of its parent company was found to be individually concerned by a
decision addressed to the subsidiaries in Ford of Europe Inc. & Ford
Werke A. C. v. Commission.151 Ford Werke, a German corporation, is a
subsidiary of Ford Motor Co. which manufacturers right-hand drive cars
and left-hand drive cars for distribution to its franchisees in Germany
and for export to other Member States. Ford Werke supplied British
distributors with right-hand drive cars.
As a result of advantageous currency exchange rates, many British
customers were buying right-hand drive cars directly from the German
franchisees. Ford Werke, concerned that this practice would undermine
Ford Britain and its distributors, sent a circular to its franchisees indicating that right-hand cars would only be available from British subsidiaries
or franchisees. The European Office of Consumer Unions expressed opposition to Ford Werke's decision and complained to the Commission.
After a hearing, the Commission decided to order Ford Werke to
withdraw its circular and to inform the German Ford dealers that the
right-hand drive cars would still be directly available to them. 2 If Ford
Werke did not comply with this decision, it would be subject to penalties.
Ford Werke and Ford of Europe contested this decision. Ford of Europe
is not a subsidiary of Ford Werke. Ford of Europe oversees the policies
of the European subsidiaries on behalf of the parent company and coordinates the allocation of economic activity among the European
subsidiaries.
The Commission argued that Ford of Europe was not individually
concerned by the decision since it was not the addressee of the decision
and would not suffer any losses on account of the decisions. 5 3 The
150
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EstablishingLocus Standi
7:157(1985)
Court rejected these arguments and found Ford of Europe individually
concerned. It held that the German dealers' effective undermining of
British Ford dealers was a problem which "unquestionably [came] within
the province of the activities for which Ford of Europe was responsible in
its capacity as co-ordinator of manufacture and sales for the companies
' 154
belonging to the Ford Group."
Advocate General Slynn elaborated on the basis of the Court's decision. He cited the "Ball Bearings" cases as indicating that the connection between a parent company and its subsidiary may be sufficiently
close for each to be individually concerned by a decision addressed to the
other. 55 He emphasized that Ford of Europe was acting on behalf of the
parent company with regard to its subsidiaries. This factor, combined
with the fact that Ford of Europe's interests were unlike the interests of
consumers and dealers, enabled the Court to find individual concern. 5 6
Thus, the coordinating body was individually distinguished.
D.

Facilitating the Administration of Justice

An applicant may sufficiently distinguish himself from others if he
files a complaint with the Council or Commission while others in his
group or position do not. Thus, he may be able to challenge a decision
1 57
adverse to his complaint. This was the result in Metro v. Commission,
a case dealing with the Community's antitrust regulations.
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty prohibits activities which result in the
restriction of trade within the Community.' 5 8 Article 3(2)(b) of Regulation 17 allows anyone with a legitimate interest to lodge a complaint with
the Commission if he suspects anticompetitive activity. In Metro, the
applicant filed a complaint with the Commission indicating that a German electronics firm did not distribute its products to self-service wholesalers such as the applicant and thereby restricted trade.
The Commission investigated the complaint and found that the electronics dealer was not engaging in anticompetitive behavior." 9 The
Commission decided not to pursue the complaint. The applicant sought
to annul the Commission's decision rejecting his complaint.
Despite the Commission's objections, the Court found the application admissible. The Court held that it was in the "interest of a satisfac154 Id.
155 Id. at 1167, 1984[l] Common Mkt. L.R. at 660.
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tory administration of justice that anyone entitled to make a complaint
under 3(2)(b) be allowed to institute proceedings if the complaint was
dismissed."' 6 ° It is likely that the applicant individualized himself by
filing the complaint while other self-service dealers had not. 6 ' The
Court also probably wanted to ensure that someone had standing to review the Commission's decisions under this Article.' 62
E.

Conclusion

After showing that the provision he is challenging is complete and
legally perfect, the nonaddressee applicant must show that he is individually concerned in order to annul a community decision under Article 173
of the EEC Treaty. To meet this burden, the applicant should consider
whether the provision is an administrative measure effectively addressed
to him. This is likely to be the case if it is a retroactive decision and is
applicable to a fixed and ascertainable group of which the applicant is a
part. A regulation may also be an administrative measure if it is really
making a bundle of individual decisions affecting the applicant's legal
position.
The nonaddressee applicant may also be individually concerned
with a decision if he is closely associated with the addressee of the decision. He should also consider whether admitting his application would
help the European Court administer justice. Under each of these possibilities, the applicant should consider any burdens he had undertaken
which may distinguish him from others, such as filing applications, entering contracts, etc.
The requirements for establishing locus standi appear to be quite formidable. Such rigorous requirements limit the amount of private input
on the effects of Community legislation. These requirements also reduce
the effectiveness of popular control for ensuring that the Council or
Commission follows the proper procedures in enacting Community secondary legislation. To the extent that the EEC is striving to become a
federation, strict locus standi requirements restrict such a development
by limiting local checks on centralized power. To the extent that the
EEC is not striving to become a federation but primarily an economic
organization, strict locus standi requirements may be desirable as they
restrict the ability of applicants to upset the delicate economic and political decisions of the Community.
Scholars should consider how the locus standi requirements affect
160 Id. at l001, 1978[2] Common Mkt. L.R. at 31.

161 T.C.
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EstablishingLocus Standi
7:157(1985)
popular input and checks on Community legislation. They should also
consider how the locus standi requirements affect the development of the
Community. It is hoped that scholars will now be in a better position to
consider these effects.
Edward J. Tabaczyk

